Russia’s Nuclear Signaling and Implications for European Security
by Aylin Matlé and András Rácz, a memo to the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) [excerpts]
C-L Note: We are reprinting parts of this document to alert listeners to the serious possibility of a “tactical” nuclear exchange between Russia and NATO arising from increasing escalations and NATO countries’ involvement in conventional attacks on Russia in the context of the war in Ukraine that now features hostilities in Russia itself.
For the first time, Moscow’s annual parade on May 9 – commemorating Victory Day, the capitulation of Nazi Germany to the Red Army in 1945 – had to be held without military vehicles due to the danger of possible Ukrainian drone strikes. A week later, May 17, hundreds of Ukrainian drones penetrated the city’s layered air defense and conducted a major air strike against the Russian capital.
Russia reacted by declaring it would conduct a nuclear test almost immediately thereafter. It also announced that it had successfully tested a RS-28 Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The Sarmat is one of the world’s most advanced ICBMs and a key element in Russia’s efforts to modernize its ground-launched nuclear arsenal. As pointed out by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the test was based on preparations that were already evident in March, as well as two Notice to Airmen Air Missions (NOTAMs) – a notice sent by national aviation authorities to alert aircraft pilots to potential dangers – announced in mid-April. The test was postponed at least twice; the reasons for the delay are not clear.
Although it was an element of a longer process, the way the Kremlin communicated it was certainly nuclear signaling. The Kremlin published the transcript of a conversation between Pres. Putin and Commander of Strategic Missile Forces Sergei Karakayev when Putin got the report about the successful test launch. In his congratulating reply, the president remarked about Russia’s nuclear capabilities being superior to the West’s.
The same pattern repeated itself following the Ukrainian drone attack on Moscow. Two days [later], Russia announced a sudden test of its nuclear forces. A major exercise started immediately, from May 19-21. According to official Russian information, it involved 64,000 soldiers, 200 missile launchers, 140 aircraft, 73 surface vessels, and 13 submarines, of which eight were nuclear missile carriers. The whole nuclear triad – ground-launched missiles, submarines, and strategic bombers – was involved.
Participating forces were the Strategic Missile Forces, both the Northern and Pacific Fleets, the Command of Long-Range Aviation, and units from the Leningrad and Central military districts. Noteworthy was the absence of the Black Sea Fleet, the Caspian Flotilla, and the Southern military district. Apparently Russia’s war on Ukraine made it impossible for its military command to allocate even symbolic forces from those units.
A likely third element in the chain of Moscow’s signaling steps was the Russian missile strike against Kyiv on May 24. It included nuclear-capable weapons, albeit assembled with conventional warheads. This was one of the most complex air strike operations against Kyiv in the entire war, demonstrating Russia’s ability to penetrate Kyiv’s air defenses.
Taken together, the ICBM test, the exercises, and the strike of May 24 constitute clear signaling from Moscow toward both Ukraine and the West about the Kremlin’s readiness to use nuclear weapons if seriously threatened.
Implications for the Security of Europe
The likelihood of the most recent exercise serving as a pretense for a nuclear escalation against Ukraine was relatively low. Among other indicators from the outset, Russia did not pull back its combat forces, making a frontline deployment of a tactical nuclear weapon impossible.
Nevertheless, the drill should be taken seriously by Germany and other NATO allies. Thus, Russia’s doctrine of “escalating to de-escalate” should prompt several policy responses. Especially as this doctrine even allows for the potential use of nuclear weapons in the case of a conventional attack if such an assault were to “endanger the very existence of the Russian Federation.”
C-L Note: Russian analysts and advisers, in conversation with Western commentators like Glenn Deisen and Judge Andrew Napolitano on YouTube, have enunciated the idea that Ukrainian and direct EU-government attacks, and assistance to Ukraine’s attacks on Moscow and elsewhere in Russia, indicate that the nuclear deterrence threat that has maintained a “cold peace” for decades has begun to lose its capacity. They argue that the use of “battlefield nukes” by Russia may be called for to reinstate the fear that gives nuclear deterrence and “mutually-assured destruction” its power to deter military action.
Continuing the excerpts from the German analysis:
Germany, together with its European allies, must invest more rapidly in NATO’s conventional deterrence posture. Strong conventional capabilities on the part of NATO complicate Russia’s “escalate to de-escalate” logic by reducing Moscow’s ability to use (limited) nuclear threats to compensate for its own potential conventional vulnerabilities.
This calls, above all, for heavy investment in deep-precision-strike capabilities that strengthen deterrence by credibly threatening high-value military targets while remaining below the nuclear threshold.
[CL note: This sounds like a pathway towards an increasingly dangerous escalation on both sides. The subhead below is enough to give the chills to anyone with memories or knowledge of World War II.]
Germany lacks sufficient nuclear expertise
The decision by the US to cancel the planned deployment of long-range fire systems to Germany has increased the urgency of closing this capability gap. Although these systems would have been assembled solely with conventional warheads, they would have strengthened NATO’s deterrence posture by threatening infrastructure critical to Russia’s military operations and nuclear support architecture, including strategic air bases and command centers.
Hence, the most recent nuclear exercise serves as a stark reminder that European allies must push forward their efforts to find solutions in this category of weapons. Procurement options from partners such as South Korea, Turkey, or Ukraine could help to close the gap. Yet, simultaneously, medium- and long-term investments into European programs such as the European Long-Range Strike Approach (ELSA) are necessary to establish a sustainable indigenous capability base.
Russia’s latest nuclear signaling attempts highlight that the nascent debate about Europe’s role in nuclear deterrence can no longer remain purely conceptual but increasingly requires actionable answers. This should not be understood as a substitute for NATO’s US-led nuclear sharing architecture, but as a complementary European layer of deterrence in response to Russia’s intensified nuclear signaling.
Germany should further and support regular French nuclear consultation formats with non-nuclear European allies, joint scenario-based exercises, and deployments of French nuclear-capable aircraft to allied bases. Such measures would [send] an important political message to Moscow: nuclear coercion against Europe could not only trigger [a US] response, but could also entail a European nuclear dimension.
While Russia’s nuclear exercise was reported in German media outlets, it triggered remarkably little public political debate. Germany lacks sufficient nuclear expertise across politics, bureaucracy, and the wider strategic community. This lack presents a problem given that Germany participates in NATO’s nuclear sharing mission by providing dual-capable aircraft. Raising Germany’s “nuclear IQ” is thus a strategic necessity.
NATO allies should communicate more clearly that Russian aggression against Alliance territory would carry costs extending beyond the immediate battlefield. The purpose of such messaging is not to signal automatic large-scale or even limited nuclear strikes against Russian territory in every contingency, but to deny Moscow the assumption that it can wage aggression against NATO while shielding critical military assets and infrastructure on its own territory from Allied responses.
Matlé, Aylin, and András Rácz. “Russia’s Nuclear Signaling in 2026 and Implications for European Security.” DGAP Memo 30 (2026). German Council on Foreign Relations. June 2026. https://doi.org/10.60823/DGAP-26-43706-en.
Aylin Matlé, Senior Research Fellow, Center for Security and Defense @AylinMatle on X
András Rácz, Senior Fellow, Center for Security and Defense
